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Thinking precisely about vagueness: an interview with Anna
Mahtani
How many hairs must a person lose before they become bald?
There doesn’t seem to be an easy way of answering this. This is
because “bald”, along with a large number of other words, is
vague. This vagueness causes problems and Anna Mahtani
specialises in thinking very precisely about these problems…
A Problem of Vagueness
We can all accept that those whose heads are entirely hairless are bald. It also seems
plausible to suggest that one single hair does not make the di韌�erence between being
bald and not being bald. However, if we accept these two reasonable sounding claims
and then consider a series of people each with one more hair on their head than the
last, then we seem compelled to accept that a person with a million hairs on their head
is also bald. This seems like a problem – and it doesn’t just apply to the word “bald”.
 
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/SawSweeHockStaircase23.jpg)

6/12/2017 Thinking precisely about vagueness: an interview with Anna Mahtani | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/blog/2014/12/04/thinking­precisely­about­vagueness­an­interview­with­anna­mahtani/ 2/6
(http://lsephilosophy.ퟋ�les.wordpress.com/2014/04/bald.jpg)
 
One proposed solution to the problem, epistemicism, holds that the key to resisting the
above “sorities” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorites_paradox) argument lies in its
second claim: it simply isn’t true, claims the epistemicist, that one single hair does not
make the di韌�erence between being bald and not being bald. What seem like vague
terms – such as “bald” – are actually perfectly precise, however (and here’s the catch)
although such terms do have precise deퟋ�nitional boundaries, we don’t (and cannot)
know where these boundaries are.
 
Anna Mahtani (http://www.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/people/mahtani.aspx), recently
appointed as an Assistant Professor in the Department, obtained her PhD for her work
on vagueness. The title of Anna’s PhD thesis was ‘New Objections to the Epistemic
Theory of Vagueness’. We decided to ask her some questions about it…
some questions
Q: Hi Anna, congratulations on your appointment. I couldn’t help noticing from the title of
your PhD thesis that you object, in some sense, to epistemicism. Before telling us about your
new objections, what were the old objections?
A: The fundamental objection is that the epistemic view is counterintuitive! People often
just think that it is crazy to say that there is some sharp cut-o韌� point between “bald” and
‘”not bald”. I think that this intuition can be unpacked into two questions:
i) What makes it the case that the boundary lies in any particular place? Why should the
boundary to “bald” lie at 2465 hairs, say, rather than at 2466? It isn’t at all plausible to say
that there is a boundary out there in nature, that scientists could discover. And it doesn’t
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seem plausible to say that we have drawn a boundary either. Sometimes we stipulate a
(relatively) sharp boundary to our terms: for example, in the UK, for tax purposes a
“heavy goods vehicle” is deퟋ�ned as a vehicle that is designed or adapted to have a
maximum weight exceeding 3,500 kilograms. But “bald” – and millions of other vague
terms and expressions in our natural language – have not been explicitly deퟋ�ned in this
way. So what is it that makes the boundary lie in any particular place?
ii) If vague terms have sharp boundaries, why don’t we know about them? On the
epistemic view, we can’t know about them. We can’t ퟋ�nd out where the boundaries lie by
carrying out scientiퟋ�c research projects, by introspection, by taking surveys of speaker’s
intuitions – or in any other way. But why is this? These are terms in our own language: if
they have sharp boundaries, surely we should be able to know where they lie?
This point is especially vivid if you think about terms that you had a hand in coining. As a
child, my brother and me had a made-up word – “sprinkle” – that we used for the sort of
sand that runs through your ퟋ�ngers and is no good for making sand-castles with. This is
a vague term: you can imagine starting o韌� with a clear case of sprinkle and adding water
drop by drop until you end up with a bucket of sludge that is clearly not sprinkle.
Intuitively no single drop of water made the di韌�erence. But on the epistemic view,
“sprinkle” has a sharp boundary: there is a point in this series at which a single drop of
water turned the sprinkle into non-sprinkle. And we – even as the coiners of the word –
can’t know where this boundary lies. That seems counterintuitive.
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Q: And the new objections?
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A: The objections that I make in the thesis are objections to a powerful defence of the
epistemic view by Timothy Williamson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy_Williamson).
Here I describe one way that I have objected to this account.
Williamson has argued that ignorance about where the boundaries to vague terms lie is
just what we would expect under the hypothesis that vague terms have sharp
boundaries. His argument draws on the idea of “inexact knowledge”. To get an idea of
what is meant by ‘inexact knowledge’, consider your current knowledge of the number of
words on this webpage. Unless you have counted the words, your knowledge is inexact.
You might know that there are more than 1000 words, and fewer than 3000, but you will
not know for any n that there are exactly n words. Even if for some n you were to believe
truly that there are exactly n words, your belief would fall short of knowledge. This is
because your belief is not safe: though it is true, it could easily have been false. I could
have included an extra word or left one out without you noticing and adjusting your
belief accordingly.
Williamson argues that (under the hypothesis that vague terms have sharp boundaries)
your knowledge of the boundaries of vague terms is similarly inexact. The thought is that
vague terms are unstable: a small and imperceptible change in our use of the term
“bald” would shift its boundary. So even if for some n you were to believe truly that the
boundary to “bald” lies at n, your knowledge would not be safe: though your belief is
true it could easily have been false.
I argue against this in two ways. First I question the account of inexact knowledge: we
can construct cases where a person’s knowledge is inexact, but where a true belief may
nevertheless be “safe” in Williamson’s sense. Secondly I argue more generally that
Williamson has not shown that if vague terms have sharp boundaries, then ignorance
about where those boundaries lie is just what we should expect: from the perspective of
someone who ퟋ�nds the epistemic view counterintuitive, if vague terms had sharp
boundaries, then the terms would be stable rather than unstable.
Q: What do you see as the most promising alternative account of vagueness?
A: Perhaps surprisingly, writing the thesis did not put me o韌� the epistemic account. I
have argued that it faces some serious problems, but that is not to say that there are no
solutions. My hope would be that the account can be made to work.
One reason to hope that it can be made to work, is that it follows from classical logic –
together with some intuitively compelling claims. If you try to deny the epistemic view,
then (unless you are prepared to say some other strange things) you end up
contradicting yourself. You can get a feel for this if you try saying that “bald” has
“borderline cases”, and mean by this that there are people who are neither bald nor not
bald. This is a contradiction: if someone is not bald, then they cannot also be not not
bald!
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Another reason to hope that the epistemic view can be made to work is that every
alternative account has problems that are (in my view) at least as serious. Take for
example the ‘degree theory’ account. On this account, sentences are not simply true or
false, but rather have a “degree of truth” between 0 and 1. So if you imagine a person
with a full head of hair, then the sentence “this person is bald” will be true to some very
low degree – perhaps degree 0. If we now imagine someone with slightly less hair, then
the sentence ‘this person is bald’ will be true to some higher degree, and for a person
with no hair at all, the sentence ‘this person is bald’ will be true to degree 1.
This account looks attractive – at least on the surface: we do sometimes say, after all,
that a claim is “true to some degree”. But all the objections to the epistemic view seem to
apply with equal force to this view. On this view, a sentence like “a man with 1543 hairs is
bald” is true to some degree: i.e. there is some number n between 0 and 1 that is the
degree of truth of this sentence. But what makes it the case that the degree of truth of
this sentence is n, rather than, say, n+0.0001? And it seems that we don’t know what
degree of truth a given sentence has: but why can’t we know what degree of truth a
sentence has?
Of course, responses have been made by degree theorists to this sort of objection, but it
is not obvious that they work – or if they do work, why the epistemic theorist can’t
respond in a similar sort of way.
Q: Finally, could you tell us a bit about how this work relates to wider issues in the philosophy
of language, in philosophy in general or even outside of philosophy?
A: One question that work on vagueness raises is this: how should we reason? Should
we reason in line with classical logic, or should we abandon classical logic in favour of
some alternative logic? The epistemic theorist claims that classical logic holds for
ordinary language, but on the degree theorist’s account we need to construct a new sort
of logic that works with degrees of truth rather than simply truth and falsity. The answer
to the question ‘how should we reason’ has a wide-reaching e韌�ect on philosophical
work.
To give just one example, I recently heard Crispin Wright
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crispin_Wright) discuss whether we should infer from the
claim that one person asserts P and another asserts not-P that one of the two people
must be mistaken. On classical logic, of course, this follows: either P is true (in which
case not-P is false), or P is false (in which case not-P is true). But on some alternative
logics, this does not follow. This can have implications for our judgements about
disagreement in all sorts of areas of philosophy.
As to how work on vagueness a韌�ects issues outside philosophy, it is clear that
philosophy has something of value to say. Should law-makers attempt to make the
terms that they use precise? How should we evaluate the “slippery slope” arguments
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that we ퟋ�nd discussed in the media, and that policy makers consider? More generally, I
think that investigating paradoxes – such as the one you present at the start of your
introduction – make us rightly cautious about our own powers of reasoning. From
apparently compelling premises, and apparently valid reasoning, we can nevertheless be
led astray.
A selection of Anna’s publications, including some of her work on vagueness, can be found
here (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/view/lseauthor/Mahtani,_Anna.html). 
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